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The Structure of Design Revolutions: 
Kuhnian Paradigm Shifts in Creative 
Problem Solving
Nathan Crilly
Design and other difficult problem solving is punctuated 
by moments of discovery.… These are the moments when 
something new and important is suddenly “seen.”1
Introduction
Researchers interested in understanding creative design have 
studied the genesis, development, and implementation of new 
ideas in design projects. The findings from such studies can be 
divided into those that emphasize the sudden emergence of new 
ideas, and those that emphasize how new ideas are gradually built 
upon those that precede them. In this article, a unification of these 
different perspectives is proposed by describing a general structure 
of creative design progress that accounts for both cumulative and 
disruptive episodes. This description is based on Thomas S. Kuhn’s 
book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,2 an historically informed 
account of scientific progress in which we can find many parallels 
with observed phenomena in creative design.3 It is argued that 
viewing creative design episodes through a Kuhnian lens yields two 
distinct benefits: first, it can sensitize researchers to the existence 
of phenomena that are not emphasized by existing accounts; and 
second, it can sensitize designers to the nature and dynamics of 
creative progress, and thereby aid reflective practice.
Creativity and design are topics that are studied from a 
variety of perspectives, and before proceeding further it is worth 
clarifying our particular frame of reference and the scope of the 
arguments we will explore. First, because our interest is in design 
rather than technology, emphasis is placed on the activities that 
occur within particular design projects rather than historical design 
developments across different product generations.4 We are also 
only interested here in the structure of creative progress, and not 
in assessing the degree of creativity attained or in the efficacy of 
creative methods.5 It follows that our focus is on descriptive accounts 
of creative design as it occurs, rather than normative models of 
design as it should be.6 Finally, we shall be restricted to considering 
the production and acceptance of ideas that are somehow new to 
the individuals and groups involved in a design project; we are 
unconcerned with whether such ideas are also new to the world 
because it is psychological rather than historical phenomena that are 
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of relevance.7 As the title indicates, we are interested in the structure 
by which acts of creative problem solving advance design. This is 
irrespective of the design discipline within which those acts are 
situated or the products towards which they are directed.
The article is divided into several sections, intended not 
just to develop a Kuhnian perspective on creative design, but also 
to more generally explore the many issues that surround such a 
perspective. We begin by reviewing different accounts of creative 
design progress, and by then reviewing Kuhn’s account of scientific 
advance. To explain how the latter relates to the former, it is argued 
that processes of scientific discovery mirror activities of creative 
design. The influence of Kuhn’s work is then discussed, looking for 
precedents in which his concepts have been used to illuminate the 
way in which design projects move forward. Having done this, we 
are able to read Kuhn’s work as though he is describing observed 
design behavior, and nine key propositions are derived that collec-
tively describe the structure of creative progress in design projects. 
Finally, opportunities for further theoretical and empirical work 
are discussed as we consider the broader implications of relating 
scientific discovery to creative design.
Creative Design Progress
Creative design has always proved a difficult activity to define 
satisfactorily, and there have been many problems in establishing 
criteria by which it might be identified.8 Despite this, the literature on 
creativity and design often requires a creative idea to be recognized 
as both novel and appropriate.9 While different design activities 
demand or permit different levels of creativity, design solutions 
that are not immediately obvious from the problem statement must 
require the generation of novel and appropriate ideas, and must 
therefore require creativity. Creativity is consequently considered 
to be an important aspect of design performance and is the stated 
objective of much design education.10 As a contributor to product 
innovation, creative design is also a key determinant of many organi-
zations’ commercial success and of a nation’s economic health.11 In 
combination, these factors all serve to promote the importance of 
modeling, enhancing, and assessing creative design. Developing a 
basic understanding of creative design underpins these activities, 
and descriptive accounts of creative progress provide a foundation 
for such understanding.
Design progress within projects is often described in terms of 
suddenly emerging ideas that are variously termed ”eureka events,” 
”ah-ha moments,“ or ”creative leaps.”12 Such ideas may seemingly 
lack preparation or precedence but can subsequently define a new 
and fruitful direction for the project.13 While often considered obvious 
once they have been recognized, these sudden insights may appear 
to share little logical connection with previous solution attempts.14 
One reason that these moments of insight are necessary at all is 
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on My Critics,” in Criticism and the 
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Volume 4, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan 
Musgrave (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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Explorations of Technological Originality 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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because designers confronted with a problem can assume or infer 
constraints that limit the solutions they explore.15 The boundaries 
of this exploration are expanded when the problem is reframed and 
designers learn to see things in new ways and to look for new kinds 
of solution.16 This suggests that sudden insights might not just relate 
to the production of creative solutions to a given problem, but also 
to the creative formulation of the problem itself.17
Creative acts often result from long periods of difficult, 
purposeful struggle—a struggle not only with the idea produced, 
but also with maintaining the contexts and self-concepts that make 
such ideas possible.18 Therefore, although sudden insights (such 
as those described above) might at first appear to yield an instan-
taneous solution to the problem, they are often prefigured by similar 
ideas that were previously neglected or are later forgotten.19 With 
respect to design, such observations lead to the suggestion that what 
might otherwise be considered a creative leap between analysis 
and synthesis could actually involve incrementally ”bridging” 
between the problem and solution with various sub-problems and 
sub-solutions.20 This corresponds with Ullman et al.’s fine-grained, 
empirically derived model of the design process, in which progress is 
gradual and cumulative.21 In the absence of right or wrong answers, 
there would appear to be little basis for abandoning interim design 
solutions, and therefore design information is said to increase 
monotonically throughout a project.22
The two preceding paragraphs outline two apparently 
conflicting perspectives on creative design progress. The first 
promotes the notion of sudden, revolutionary leaps forward, while 
the second focuses on how ideas are incrementally built upon those 
that precede them.23 There is generally little attempt made to relate 
these different types of developmental episodes and their interde-
pendence remains unexamined. This is in contrast to perspectives on 
science, where disruptive and incremental episodes of development 
were famously integrated into a single account by Thomas S. 
Kuhn in his 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.24 
Considering creative design from this perspective suggests that a 
similar integration is necessary for design theory if the structure of 
creative design progress is to be better understood. To address this, 
we shall now turn our attention to Kuhn’s work, both to gain an 
understanding of how disruptive and incremental episodes might 
be characterized, and also of how they might be related.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Kuhn’s account of scientific development distinguishes between 
relatively stable periods of cumulative progress called “normal 
science,” and disruptive episodes of relatively sudden change 
called “revolutionary science.” In normal science, the research 
community shares a common set of beliefs, values, and techniques, 
and they also agree on what work can be regarded as exemplary. 
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(1997), 427–40; Kees Dorst and Nigel 
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“Design Fixation,” Design Studies 12:1 
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363–83; Evangelia G. Chrysikou and 
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These characteristics collectively define the prevailing “paradigm” 
within which scientists work. This paradigm directs attention to the 
scientific puzzles that must be solved, and scientists are focused on 
the extension and articulation of the paradigm rather than seeking its 
replacement. Over time, the cumulative refinement of the paradigm 
generates a range of observations that are seen as being anomalous 
with theory, and, despite resistance, these anomalies eventually 
provoke crisis. 
In response to mounting crises, revolutionary science involves 
the proposal of a new perspective that fundamentally challenges 
the assumptions, orientations, and expectations of the community. 
This proposal may be accepted and thereby replace the existing 
paradigm if it promises to resolve some remaining problems while 
also preserving some of what has already been achieved. These 
“paradigm shifts” often demand the re-examination of previously 
established knowledge as not all of the preceding paradigm survives 
the revolution. Such shifts also define new directions for research by 
rendering previous puzzles unproblematic and by pointing to new 
puzzles that must be solved. In time, the newly accepted paradigm 
becomes the basis for another period of normal science which may 
in the future encounter crises that again provoke revolution. (For 
readers unfamiliar with Kuhn’s thesis, an illustrative example 
of a scientific paradigm shift—the “Copernican revolution” in 
astronomy—is provided in the appendix.)
Relating Scientific Discovery to Creative Design 
Kuhn’s account of scientific progress clearly integrates cumulative 
and disruptive episodes, and also suggests how each type of episode 
is related to the other. What is not immediately clear, however, is 
why an historically informed account of the processes that lead to 
and follow scientific discovery should be considered relevant to the 
episodes of creativity that occur within contemporary design projects. 
Science and design are ostensibly distinct branches of human 
activity, as exemplified by the educational, cultural, and professional 
divisions that typically separate them.25 As such, the suggestion that 
studying one can illuminate the other demands further scrutiny. 
Before asserting Kuhn’s relevance to design, we must therefore first 
seek to establish the plausibility of such an assertion, and identify 
the precedents upon which it might be based.
Many studies of creativity examine the work of artists and 
scientists in an attempt to uncover the cognitive processes that are 
common to both.26 Such studies seldom make reference to design, 
but like design, both artistic creativity and scientific discovery can 
be considered as problem solving activities.27 Acts of discovery and 
creation can thus be established as lying on a continuum where the 
solutions to highly constrained problems must be discovered while 
the solutions to relatively unconstrained problems are created.28 From 
this perspective, the nature of creative acts is not defined by the 
16 Donald A. Schön, Invention and the 
Evolution of Ideas (London: Tavistock, 
1967); Donald A. Schön, The Reflective 
Practitioner: How Professionals Think 
in Action (London: Temple Smith, 1983); 
Rianne Valkenburg and Kees Dorst, “The 
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Design Studies 19:3 (1998), 249–71. Such 
reframing may take place with respect 
to an understanding of the problem or 
an understanding of how design is to be 
conducted. See Raymonde Guindon, Herb 
Krasner, and Bill Curtis, “Breakdowns 
and Processes During the Early Activities 
of Software Design by Professionals” 
(paper presented at the Empirical stud-
ies of programmers: second workshop, 
Norwood, NJ, 1987), 71–74.
17 Mary Lou Maher and Josiah Poon, 
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Co-Evolution,” Microcomputers in Civil 
Engineering 11:3 (1996), 195–209; Dorst 
and Cross, “Creativity in the Design 
Process,” 434.
18 Howard E. Gruber, “The Evolving Systems 
Approach to Creative Work,” in Creative 
People at Work: Twelve Cognitive 
Case Studies, ed. Doris B. Wallace 
and Howard E. Gruber (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 3–24.
19 David N. Perkins, The Mind’s Best Work 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1981), 43–49.
20 Cross, “Descriptive Models of Creative 
Design,” 432, 439; Nigel Cross, 
Designerly Ways of Knowing, (London: 
Springer, 2006), 92.
21 David. G. Ullman, Thomas. G. Dietterich, 
and Larry A. Stauffer, “A Model of the 
Mechanical Design Process Based on 
Empirical Data,” Artificial Intelligence in 
Engineering Design and Manufacturing 
2:1 (1988): 35, 41.
22 Vinod Goel and Peter Pirollia, “The 
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fields to which they are directed (e.g. art, technology, science), but 
by how tightly bound the solution space is, and by what factors 
determine that boundary (e.g. cultural, economic, physical).29 Such 
observations permit Dasgupta’s view that “the process of inventing 
artifactual forms (or creating original designs) in the artificial 
sciences is cognitively indistinguishable at the knowledge level from 
the processes of inventing theories or discovering laws in the natural 
sciences.”30 Intuitive support for this may be found in the language 
that is used to describe the production of new ideas in science and 
design: while natural phenomena are discovered, the theories to 
explain those phenomena are invented; conversely, while artifacts 
might be invented, the process of invention involves moments of 
discovery.31
In his substantial study of creativity in different times and 
cultures, Koestler argues that the basic pattern of progress observed 
in creative individuals is similar to that observed in the history of 
the fields they serve.32 In both, there are short bursts of revolutionary 
discovery that punctuate longer periods of assimilation, consoli-
dation, and interpretation. Furthermore, Koestler claims that the 
mechanism that underlies this pattern is also similar: revolutions 
are held at bay by a personal or cultural “blindness” that is imposed 
by the existing paradigm.33 From a psychological perspective, Perkins 
makes similar arguments, claiming that Kuhn’s idea of collectively 
accepted paradigms fits the general notion of personally established 
schemata (where schemata are the mental structures that allow a 
person to perceive or act effectively by anticipating the organization 
of what is apprehended or produced).34 This leads Perkins to propose 
that, like paradigms, schemata enable skilled performance within 
their scope, while severely inhibiting creativity beyond their scope.35 
Such claims allow the possibility of drawing parallels between 
historical accounts of collective discovery on the one hand, and 
shorter episodes of individual creativity on the other.
The arguments above suggest: first, that similarities might 
be observed between the nature of scientific discovery and that 
of creative design; and second, that the patterns enacted on an 
historic scale may mirror those observable on a personal scale. With 
respect to the first point, Kuhn acknowledged this by claiming that 
long before his own work on the structure of scientific advance, 
historians had portrayed the humanities as developing through a 
similar succession of traditions punctuated by revolutionary shifts 
in style, taste, viewpoint, and goal.36 With respect to the second point, 
Kuhn’s applicability to personally creative acts should perhaps not 
surprise us because Kuhn was generally interested in the nature of 
conceptual change, not just in infrequent scientific change.37 He asked 
what sort of ideas could be thought of at any one time, and what sort 
of impact a given idea could have on collective understanding and 
action. Such questions are clearly relevant to progress in design and 
23 Such a distinction might typically be 
labeled “revolutionary” versus “evolu-
tionary,” but this terminology is avoided 
here because evolutionary theories can 
also account for sudden change. See 
Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould, 
“Punctuated equilibria: an alternative 
to phyletic gradualism,” in Models in 
paleobiology, ed. Thomas. J. M. Schopf. 
(San Francisco: Freeman, Cooper & Co, 
1972), 82–115. Nevertheless, accounts 
of design progress frequently make 
reference to the concepts of biological 
evolution because they provide an inter-
esting analogical approach to describing 
the creative development of ideas. For 
psychological perspectives, see Dean K. 
Simonton, “Creativity as Blind Variation 
and Selective Retention: Is the Creative 
Process Darwinian?” Psychological 
Inquiry 10:4 (1999), 309–28. For design 
perspectives see Philip Steadman, The 
evolution of designs: biological analogy 
in architecture and the applied arts, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979); John Z. Langrish, “Darwinian 
Design: The Memetic Evolution of Design 
Ideas,” Design Issues 20:4 (2004), 4–19; 
Jennifer Whyte, “Evolutionary Theories 
and Design Practices,” Design Issues 
23:2 (2007), 46–54. Note that Whyte 
supports the notion that evolutionary 
theories are relevant to product develop-
ment across different generations, but 
not within a particular design project, 
ibid., 53. For Kuhn’s perspective on evolu-
tionary accounts of conceptual progress 
see Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions , 170–72; “A Discussion 
with Thomas S. Kuhn,” in The Road 
since Structure: Philosophical Essays, 
1970–1993, ed. James Conant and 
John Haugeland (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2000), 307.
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therefore Kuhn’s ideas might be applied there just as they have been 
successfully applied to other areas that he did not anticipate.38
Applying Kuhn to Design 
Since its first publication in 1962, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
has sold over one million copies in over 20 languages.39 It has been 
listed as the most highly cited work in the arts and humanities,40 
and is considered to be one of the most influential books ever 
written.41 What is particularly striking is that despite Kuhn’s 
intuitions,42 his concepts and arguments have been adopted across 
the social sciences.43 Furthermore, although often divorced from 
his originally intended meanings, his terminology—especially 
“paradigm shift”—has entered into common usage and has been 
co-opted by disciplines such as marketing, management, and 
information technology.44 Because of his extensive influence, it is 
often remarked—and often seriously—that Kuhn prompted his own 
paradigm shift within the sociology of knowledge.45
Considering the widespread impact of Kuhn’s work, there is 
surprisingly little reference to Kuhn in the design literature. Those 
who do cite Kuhn often do so summarily, not to support the notion 
that design projects operate within distinct paradigms, but that design 
research does (or might or should).46 This is understandable given 
Kuhn’s arguments, but is in contrast to the closely related field of 
technology studies where his concepts have been applied to accounts 
of technological progress.47 In particular, Anderson and Tushman 
build on Kuhn’s work to develop a cyclical model where incremental 
technological progress is punctuated by sudden ”technological 
discontinuities.”48 Constant also builds on Kuhn’s work to define 
periods of ”normal technology” and ”technological revolution,” 
and Dosi extends Kuhn’s concept of paradigms to define ”techno-
logical paradigms” that account for continuous and discontinuous 
innovation.49 Vincenti’s study of engineering knowledge brings us 
closer to design by further building on Constant’s work to define 
the terms ”normal design” and ”radical design.”50 Unfortunately 
his focus is on the former, which he describes as an evolutionary 
process that does not require the invention of new forms, functions, 
or features. In contrast, Wake’s work on ”design paradigms” does 
emphasize paradigm shifts, but primarily with a view to promoting 
creative progress rather than understanding its structure.51
Although the work mentioned above makes reference to 
Kuhn’s terminology and concepts, none focuses on the details of his 
arguments.52 For a more extensive exploration of Kuhn’s relevance to 
design we must turn to the work of Dasgupta. Dasgupta exploits the 
Kuhnian definition of a scientific paradigm to describe not only the 
research traditions from which design creativity can be studied,53 but 
also the models of the design process that designers subscribe to.54 
However, what interests us most here is that Dasgupta’s attention to 
Kuhn leads him to make a comparison between ”normal and revolu-
24 The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
was first published in 1962 as a mono-
graph in the Vienna Circle’s International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science. At 
Kuhn’s request, it was also published as 
a separate book that same year by the 
same publisher, University of Chicago 
Press. In this article we refer to the 
third edition of the book (1996), which 
includes a new index and retains the 
second edition’s extensive explanatory 
postscript (a postscript that Kuhn wrote 
in 1969 to address critics’ responses to 
the first edition). Despite making various 
suggestions that a revised and expanded 
version of the book was necessary, Kuhn 
had not published this by his death in 
1996. For examples of the criticisms to 
which Kuhn’s postscript responds, see 
Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., 
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: 
Proceedings of the International 
Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, 
London, 1965, Volume 4 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970).
25 For specific arguments about the 
relationship between design and 
science see Nigel Cross, “Designerly 
Ways of Knowing: Design Discipline 
Versus Design Science,” Design 
Issues 17:3 (2001), 49–55; Jonathan 
Cagan, Kenneth Kotovsky, and Herbert 
A. Simon, “Scientific Discovery and 
Inventive Engineering Design,” in Formal 
Engineering Design Synthesis, edited 
by Erik K. Antonsson and Jonathan 
Cagan, 442–65. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). For related 
arguments about the divisions between 
the sciences and humanities, see C. P. 
Snow, The Two Cultures. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Includes the 1959 text “The Two Cultures 
and the Scientific Revolution,” together 
with its 1964 successor piece, “A Second 
Look”).
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tionary science” on the one hand and ”routine and inventive design” 
on the other. With routine design, the artifact’s general form and 
behavior are known at the outset, while inventive design involves 
establishing a new form of artifact or a new approach to the creation 
of artifacts. Routine design operates within an existing paradigm 
whereas inventive design proposes a new paradigm that may 
eventually replace the old.55 Although Dasgupta may at first appear 
to be embarking on a project similar to that undertaken here, Kuhn 
is only one of many scholars who inform Dasgupta’s work, and the 
hypotheses Dasgupta develops do not in themselves represent a 
Kuhnian perspective on creative design.56 
Despite the promise that Kuhn’s work would seem to hold, 
his detailed account of the structure within which new ideas are 
developed, accepted, refined, and superseded appears not to have 
been applied to the study of creative design. However, it is argued 
here that Kuhn’s historically informed account of scientific progress 
provides a useful vantage point from which creative design practice 
might be viewed. Accepting this permits a close reading of The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions to yield interesting propositions 
about the structure of progress in creative design projects.
The Structure of Creative Design Progress
If we read Kuhn as though he is describing design rather than science, 
we can derive a new account of the nature and dynamics of creative 
design progress. This account is divided into nine propositions 
which are presented below. Each proposition is introduced with a 
short quotation from Kuhn, which is then followed by a statement 
of elaboration. As mentioned earlier, the direct translation of Kuhn’s 
terminology into the design domain has already been performed by 
authors interested in the historical development of products across 
different generations. Therefore, to avoid confusing design progress 
within projects with that between projects, use of the terms ”normal 
design,” ”revolutionary design,” and ”design paradigm” are avoided 
here. Instead, the terms ”cumulative design” and ”conceptual 
reorientation” are used to describe the phases through which creative 
design proceeds.
P1: Pre-cumulative design is undirected.
In the absence of a paradigm or some candidate for paradigm, 
all of the facts that could possibly pertain to the development 
of a given science are likely to seem equally relevant.57
If a design problem is considered without any strong conceptual 
orientation, the many pieces of available design information can 
become difficult to identify and sort. To address this, various differ-
ent concepts are tried, and eventually an initial orientation toward 
the problem, the solution, or the process emerges.
26 For example, see Arthur Koestler, The Act 
of Creation (London: Hutchinson, 1964); 
Vera John-Steiner, Notebooks of the 
Mind: Explorations of Thinking (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997 [revised 
edition]); Perkins, The Mind’s Best Work; 
Teresa M. Amabile, Creativity in Context: 
Update to ‘The Social Psychology of 
Creativity’ (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1996); Doris B. Wallace and Howard E. 
Gruber, Creative People at Work: Twelve 
Cognitive Case Studies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1989).
27 For design as problem solving, see 
Herbert A. Simon, The Sciences of the 
Artificial (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981 
[2nd edition]). For art as problem solving, 
see David Ecker, “The Artistic Process as 
Qualitative Problem Solving,” Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism 21:3 (1963), 
283–90. For science as problem solv-
ing, see Pat Langley, Herbert A. Simon, 
Gary L. Bradshaw, and Jan M. Zytkow, 
Scientific Discovery: Computational 
Explorations of the Creative Processes 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 5–7.
28 Robert M. French, “Discovery and 
Creation: Opposite Ends of a Continuum 
of Constraints,” unpublished manuscript, 
Université de Bourgogne. Although it 
can be argued that (unlike creation) 
discovery only involves the “uncovering” 
of that which already exists, such views 
are criticized for failing to recognize 
that discovery is a gradual process of 
conceptual change involving cognitive 
re-orientation towards the subject of 
interest. See Jacob Bronowski, “The 
Creative Process,” Leonardo 18:4 (1985), 
245; Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and the Social 
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P2: Cumulative design is conservative.
Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, 
when successful, finds none.58
With some particular conceptual orientation established, much work 
is devoted to exploring its possibilities, and refining its performance. 
During these periods of cumulative design, efforts are not directed 
towards generating alternative new concepts, but to developing the 
existing concept as much as possible.
P3: Cumulative design is productive.
Normal science…is a highly cumulative enterprise, eminently 
successful in its aim, the steady extension of the scope and 
precision of scientific knowledge.59 
Periods of cumulative design are extremely effective because design-
ers understand the problems to be addressed and know where to 
direct their efforts. Progress is incrementally achieved because none 
of the developments fundamentally challenge the underlying concept 
and therefore retrograde design moves are not encountered.
P4: Cumulative design leads to perceived inadequacies.
Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly… 
It then continues with a more or less extended exploration  
of the area of anomaly.60
Despite the effective progress made during periods of cumulative 
design, this progress also leads to the perception of various 
inadequacies that bring into question the underlying conceptual 
orientation. However, without a new candidate concept to consider, 
this only provokes renewed efforts to understand how the existing 
concept can be made to work.
P5: Perceived inadequacies provoke conceptual reorientation.
Scientists…often speak of the “scales falling from the eyes” or 
of the “lightning flash” that “inundates” a previously obscure 
puzzle, enabling its components to be seen in a new way….61
Immersed in the inadequacies that are perceived in the existing 
concept, designers experience a sudden insight that reveals a new 
possible solution to the problem or a new perspective on the prob-
lem itself. Despite its apparent novelty, this insight may have been 
prefigured by other related ideas, and it is therefore the recognition 
of these insights rather than their formation that is disruptive.
P6: Conceptual reorientation reveals new problem-solution spaces.
Led by a new paradigm, scientists adopt new instruments and 
look in new places. Even more important, during revolutions 
scientists see new and different things when looking with 
familiar instruments in places they have looked before.62
Conceptual reorientation influences which aspects of the situation are 
attended to, and also what is perceived in those aspects. Therefore, 
29 In this sense, Hafner claims that while 
distinguishing artists from scientists is 
an intuitively obvious thing to do, doing 
so with any precision is a difficult task 
because each requires a combination 
of knowledge and skill, each proceeds 
through processes of creation and 
discovery, each is sustained by aesthetic 
and structural sensitivities, and each 
demands discipline while benefiting 
from fortune. E. M. Hafner, “The New 
Reality in Art and Science,” Comparative 
Studies in Society and History (Special 
Issue on Cultural Innovation) 11:4 (1969), 
390. Kuhn recognized this view but did 
not welcome it. See Thomas S. Kuhn, 
“[The New Reality in Art and Science]: 
Comment,” Comparative Studies in 
Society and History 11:4 (1969), 403–12. 
For further reading on this matter see 
David R. Topper and John H. Holloway, 
“Interrelationships between the Visual 
Arts, Science and Technology: A 
Bibliography,” Leonardo 13:1 (1980), 
29–33.
30 Dasgupta, Creativity in Invention and 
Design, 210–11. Also see Dasgupta, 
Design Theory and Computer Science, 
353–80. This is perhaps only a specific 
instance of the more general claim 
that, like natural scientists, people 
form and test hypotheses to generate 
everyday knowledge. George A. Kelly, 
The Psychology of Personal Constructs: 
Volume One—A Theory of Personality 
(London: Routledge, 1991 [reprint]), 4–5, 
9–11.
31 For invention in science, see Kuhn, The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 8, 
52, 66; for discovery in art and design 
see Ernst H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion: 
A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial 
Representation, Mellon Lectures in the 
Fine Arts (London: Phaidon Press, 1968 
[3rd Edition]); Donald A. Schön and Glen 
Wiggins, “Kinds of Seeing and Their 
Functions in Designing,” Design Studies 
13:2 (1992), 135–56.
32 Koestler, The Act of Creation, 224–25, 
53.
33 Ibid., 236.
34 Perkins, The Mind’s Best Work , 178.
35 Ibid., 173.
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the degree to which the previous concept had prevented exploration 
(or even perception) of the alternatives becomes apparent as new 
problem-solution spaces are uncovered.
P7: Conceptual reorientation is resisted.
In science, … novelty emerges only with difficulty, manifested 
by resistance, against a background provided by expectation.63
Even once recognized, the newly proposed concept proves to be both 
difficult to comprehend and difficult to accept. Comprehension is 
inhibited by the fundamentally different perspective that is required, 
while acceptance is inhibited by the recognition that prior work will 
be invalidated and future work must proceed from a less well-devel-
oped foundation.
P8: Candidate concepts are accepted on promise.
[T]he new theory is said to be “neater,” “more suitable,” or 
“simpler” than the old.… [T]he importance of [these] aesthetic 
considerations can sometimes be decisive.64
Given the potentially well-refined state of the existing concept, 
new candidate concepts may at first not compete well with those 
they are proposed to replace. Consequently, new concepts must be 
accepted for development on the basis of their apparent promise 
rather than their current performance. This promise may be assessed 
with respect to qualities that cannot be defended rationally, and with 
recourse to intuition rather than measurement.
P9: Conceptual reorientations are incomplete.
[T]he puzzles that constitute normal science exist only because 
no paradigm that provides a basis for scientific research ever 
completely resolves all of its problems.65
The acceptance of a new concept prompts a renewed process of 
cumulative design in the hope of developing that concept into a more 
effective solution to the problem. However, while some of the inad-
equacies perceived in the preceding concept will now be resolved, 
some will still remain and others will have been introduced. Later 
perception of these inadequacies may prompt further conceptual 
reorientations.
These nine propositions collectively describe creative design as a 
process of cumulative development punctuated by disruptive reori-
entations. However, the opportunity to progress from one episode to 
the next—and to do so repeatedly—is determined by the resources 
available (e.g. time) and other contextual factors (e.g. motivation). 
Consequently, any particular project may be entirely constrained 
to a single period of cumulative design, or may be punctuated by 
one or more disruptive episodes. These disruptions may also vary 
in scope, sometimes involving large-scale revolutions in which the 
entire problem-solution is re-conceptualized, and sometimes involv-
36 Kuhn, “Reflections on My Critics,” 
243; Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, 208; Thomas S. Kuhn, 
“Comments on the Relations of Science 
and Art,” in The Essential Tension: 
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and Change (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1977), 348. It is elsewhere 
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technology practices can be described in 
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the development of the natural sciences. 
For art, see Koestler, The Act of Creation, 
252, 396; for design, craft, and tech-
nology, see Stephen Toulmin, Human 
Understanding (Oxford, UK: Clarendon 
Press, 1972), 364. Hafner exploits this 
similarity by using Seuphor’s comments 
on modern art to describe the public’s 
view of science, and also Kuhn’s account 
of scientific revolutions to describe 
changes in artistic perception. See 
Hafner, “The New Reality in Art and 
Science,” 390; Michel Seuphor, Abstract 
Painting (New York: Dell, 1964).
37 Kuhn, “Reflections on My Critics,” 
249–50.
38 Barnes, T. S. Kuhn and the Social 
Science, 15.
39 Wes W. Sharrock and Rupert J. Read, 
Kuhn: Philosopher of Scientific Revolution 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Thomas 
Nickles, Thomas Kuhn (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1.
40 Eugene Garfield, “A Different Sort of 
Great-Books List: The 50 Twentieth-
Century Works Most Cited in the Arts & 
Humanities Citation Index, 1976–1983,” 
Essays of an Information Scientist 10, 
(Current Comments 16, 1987), 101–5.
41 Martin Seymour-Smith, The 100 Most 
Influential Books Ever Written: The 
History of Thought from Ancient Times 
to Today (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 
1998); also see “The Hundred Most 
Influential Books since the War,” The 
Times Literary Supplement (October 6, 
1995).
42 For Kuhn’s views on the differences 
between the natural and social sciences, 
see Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, x, 162–63; and Thomas 
S. Kuhn, “The Natural and Human 
Sciences,” in The Road since Structure.
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ing only relatively small-scale shifts in how the purpose, process, or 
product is regarded. Furthermore, episodes of reorientation may be 
confined to a single individual, or may be distributed across various 
stakeholders in the design process. Despite these variations in the 
frequency of reorientation, its scope, or its distribution, in following 
Kuhn’s arguments it is suggested here that the general structure of 
creative design progress follows the basic pattern outlined above.
Further Work
This article has drawn on The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to 
propose an account of creative design progress. Despite any similari-
ties that might be found between episodes of scientific progress and 
those of creative design, Kuhn was essentially intending to describe 
different phenomena than those that have interested us here. There 
are consequently aspects of Kuhn’s account that are not relevant 
to the study of creative design, and in particular, he placed special 
emphasis on issues of incommensurability and narrative reconstruc-
tion. Such concepts have not warranted discussion here, and no 
propositions have been derived from them. However, these concepts 
and many other aspects of Kuhn’s work may be of interest to design 
scholars attending to other topics, especially those interested in the 
history of designed objects, and the practice of design research and 
design education.66
This article has argued generally for some connection 
between scientific discovery and creative design, but we have been 
limited to exploring the work of only one science scholar—Thomas 
S. Kuhn. If analogies between scientific discovery and creative 
design are considered useful, then future work might also benefit 
from accounts of scientific progress provided by other scholars. Of 
particular note are Popper’s proposed system of conjectures and 
refutations and Feyerabend’s notions of counter-inductive moves.67 
Viewing creative design progress through the various lenses that 
these and other scholars offer may lead to accounts that support, 
refine, or challenge those offered here. Whichever of these might 
occur, attending to work from the well-established and intellectually 
attractive field of philosophy of science can be expected to yield 
valuable contributions for design theory.
While there is benefit in using the philosophy of science 
to develop theoretical accounts of design, it might also be used to 
inform the planning of empirical studies. For example, we have seen 
here how viewing creative design episodes through a Kuhnian lens 
can yield a number of interesting propositions. Such propositions 
might then be used as the basis for a number of empirical studies 
that seek to establish the prevalence, determinants, and impact of the 
described phenomena. These investigations might employ a variety 
of well-established creativity research methods, including retrospec-
tive self-report, controlled experimentation, and protocol analysis. 
Such work could provide greater insight into the nature of creative 
43 For general comments on Kuhn’s impact 
on the social sciences, see Barry Barnes, 
T. S. Kuhn and the Social Science 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 
1982); Steve Fuller, Thomas Kuhn: A 
Philosophical History for Our Times 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2000), 1. For application to particular 
disciplines see, for example, Alfred W. 
Coats, “Is There a ‘Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions’ in Economics?” Kyklos 22:2 
(1969), 289–96; Allan R. Buss, “The 
Structure of Psychological Revolutions,” 
Journal of the History of the Behavioral 
Sciences 14:1 (2006), 57–64.
44 For example, see Don Tapscott and 
Art Caston, Paradigm Shift: The New 
Promise of Information Technology 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993); 
Christian Grönroos, “Keynote Paper: 
From Marketing Mix to Relationship 
Marketing—Towards a Paradigm Shift in 
Marketing,” Management Decision 35:4 
(1997), 322–39; Ikujiro Nonaka, Katsuhiro 
Umemoto, and Dai Senoo, “From 
Information Processing to Knowledge 
Creation: A Paradigm Shift in Business 
Management,” Technology in Society 
18:2 (1996), 203–18.
45 It is worth noting that in comparison to 
the work of his peers, Kuhn’s book is 
relatively short and accessible, and writ-
ten in a quite poetic rather than strictly 
logical manner. Furthermore, Kuhn’s book 
is a comparatively open text that permits 
or inspires a wide variety of interpreta-
tions. In acknowledgment of this, Kuhn 
stated that: “Part of the reason for its 
success is, I regretfully conclude, that it 
can be nearly all things to all people.” 
See Thomas S. Kuhn, “Second Thoughts 
on Paradigms,” in The Essential Tension, 
293. For a more critical socio-historical 
explanation of Kuhn’s impact, see Fuller, 
Thomas Kuhn.
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design in general, and more specifically into how different aspects 
of creative design progress are related.
In addition to assessing the fidelity of the account provided 
here, there is also promise in studying what effect an awareness 
of that account has on design practice. For example, researchers 
might prime designers with a Kuhnian perspective on creative 
design and observe what effect the anticipation of conceptual 
reorientation has on its occurrence. One possibility is that designers 
would be encouraged to consider any particular perspective on 
the design problem to be productive while also recognizing it as 
partial, contingent, and temporary. Phenomena such as ”fixation” or 
”conceptual lock” might therefore be effectively guarded against if 
designers were to more readily anticipate and accept the disruptive 
influence of reorientation. Empirical work could potentially 
determine whether this effect is realized or whether some other 
unanticipated effect occurs.
Conclusions
This article began by stating that two perspectives on creative 
progress predominate in the design literature. On the one hand are 
those accounts that emphasize the effect of sudden insights, and 
on the other hand are those that emphasize gradual and cumula-
tive change. Unfortunately, these different perspectives have largely 
existed in mutual isolation or are presented in mutual opposition. 
In contrast, this article has sought to show that these two perspec-
tives can not only coexist, but should actually be combined. Sudden 
insights are prompted by—and resisted because of—the periods of 
incremental development that precede them. Each type of episode 
can only be understood in relation to the other because they are 
interdependent.
With reference to Kuhn’s account of scientific advance, a 
series of propositions have been developed that characterize periods 
of cumulative design and episodes of conceptual reorientation. It is 
contended here that taken as a set, these propositions can sensitize 
researchers to interesting phenomena that are not emphasized by 
existing accounts. It is also contended that these propositions can 
sensitize designers to the structure of creative design progress and 
thereby aid reflective practice. Future work may be conducted to 
examine the validity of the propositions presented here, and also 
the utility they offer to researchers and designers. However, if this 
article only serves to stimulate interest in the structure of creative 
progress in design, or the promise that Kuhn and other philosophers 
of science hold for design, then this present project will have been 
worthwhile.
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Appendix
To illustrate the rather abstract summary of Kuhn’s thesis offered in 
the main text, an historical example is provided here in which the 
important features of a scientific paradigm shift can be identified. 
Kuhn supported his arguments with examples drawn from various 
scientific disciplines, including Lavoisier’s discovery of oxygen, 
Dalton’s invention of atomic theory, and Maxwell’s work on electro-
magnetism. However, we will restrict ourselves to an example from 
the history of astronomy, in particular, the transition from a geocen-
tric to a heliocentric cosmology. This has the advantage of being a 
generally well-known scientific advance and of involving episodes 
that can rightly be regarded as design activities.68 ”The Copernican 
Revolution” and its aftermath are therefore outlined below, both to 
clarify the salient features of Kuhn’s thesis and also to provide a 
reference for the propositions developed in the article.
For approximately 1400 years, Man’s conception of his place 
in the cosmos was dominated by an astronomical model proposed by 
Ptolemy in the first century ad. This held that the Earth was the fixed 
center of the universe and that the moon, planets, and stars rotated 
on a number of concentric spheres. Difficulties in achieving a good 
match between predicted celestial movements and those that were 
observed led to the development of a complicated Ptolemaic system 
that involved placing the planets on an ever increasing number of 
epicycles (“wheels within wheels”). This geocentric system was 
eventually challenged in the 16th century by Copernicus, who 
proposed a heliocentric model, with the Earth and other planets 
orbiting the Sun, and the moon orbiting the earth. 
Although Copernicus’ model brought us closer to our present 
understanding of the solar system, he preserved the circular orbits 
required by Aristotelian dogma. For that reason and others, his 
model was initially more complex in its details than the well-refined 
Ptolemaic system with which it was competing. In the century 
and a half following Copernicus’ death, Brahe made more precise 
observations of the heavens, Kepler defined the nature of elliptical 
orbits, Galileo developed the law of inertia, and Newton the law of 
universal gravitation. All these contributions refined the Copernican 
system into a logically coherent and comparatively precise 
astronomical model. This model guided observation and theory for 
over 200 years until Einstein published his work on relativity in the 
early twentieth century.69 
In Kuhnian terms, these developments in the history of 
astronomy would be described as a long period of normal science 
(the refinement of the Ptolemaic system) that eventually suffered 
from mounting crises (complications and inaccuracies).70 A rival 
paradigm was then proposed (the Copernican system) which was 
at first resisted (on ideological and technical grounds) but which 
eventually prompted a paradigm shift (including numerous 
conceptual reorientations). The articulation and refinement of the 
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new (heliocentric) system constituted another period of normal 
science. Eventually this too was challenged by an alternative 
candidate paradigm (Einstein’s), one that promised to resolve some 
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